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DICKINSON LAW REVIEW

RECENT CASES
CRIMINAL LAW - HOMICIDE - INSANITY DEFENSE
DEFINITION OF INSANITY - A MATTER OF FACT

-

FOR JURY DETERMINATION
Until July, 1954, the federal courts of the District of Columbia had used both
the M'Naughten test' and the "irresistible impulse" test 2 in order to determine
vhether a defendant was sane enough to be held responsible for his crimes. Under
the M'Naughten test it was required that the defendant, in order to be found insane,
must be under a defect of reason from a disease of the mind and as a result does
not know the nature and quality of the criminal act or does not know that the act
was wrong.' This has become known as the "right and wrong test".
It was not until 1929 that the "irresistible impulse" test was adopted in Smith
v. United States. 4 Here it was required that the defendant be impelled to do the
act as a result of an irresistible impulse which was caused by a diseased mind which
left the defendant powerless to resist the impulse.
In Durham v. United States,5 the United States Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia added an entirely new doctrine to the defense of insanity.0 Recognizing the shortcomings of the two tests mentioned above, the court held:
"The rule we now hold must be applied on the retrial of this case
and in future cases is not unlike that followed by the New Hampshire
court since 1870. It is simply that an accused is not criminally r'esponsible
if his unlawful act was the product of mental disease or mental defect."
The court further stated:
"We use 'disease' in the sense of a condition which is considered
capable of either improving or deteriorating. We use 'defect' in the sense
of a condition which is not considered capable of either improving or
deteriorating and which may be either congenital, or the result of injury,
or the residual effect of a physical or mental disease."
Considering the New Hampshire rule which is mentioned in the Durham
case, it is noted that this doctrine was first considered in the law by Justice Doe in
a dissenting opinion in Boardman v. Woodman,' where he said:
"If the jury were instructed that certain manifestations wer'e symptoms of consumption, cholera, congestion, or poison, a verdict rendered
in accordance with such instructions would be set aside, not because they
were not correct, but because the question of their correctness was one of
fact to be determined by the jury upon evidence. Experts may testify as to
1

U.S. v. Lee, 15 D.C. 489, 4 Mackey 489 (1886).

2

Smith v. United States, 59 App. D.C. 144, 36 F.2d 548 (1929).

3
4

10 Clark and Finelly 200 (1843).
See n. 2, supra.

r,

-App.

6

In accord is -App.

'

47 N.H. 120 (1865).

D.C.-, 214 F.2d 862 (1954).

D.C.-, 214 F.2d 879 (1954).
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the indications of mental disease, as they could not if such indications
were a matter of law."
Again he said in the same dissent:
"That cannot be a fact in law, which is not a fact in science; that
cannot be health in law, which is disease in fact." 9
This was the first expression of what a few years later became known as the
New Hampshire rule. The rule was announced as such in the majority opinion by
Justice Smith in State v. Pike, 10 which was an appeal of a murder case. It was stated
as follows:
"The court instructed the jury 'that whether there is such a disease as
dipsomania, and whether the defendant had that disease, and whether
the killing of Brown was the product of such disease, were questions of
fact for the jury.'"
The instruction was upheld by the court which said, "Whether there is such a
disease is a question of science and fact, not of law." The doctrine was reiterated
in State v. Jones," where the court said:
". .. the verdict should be 'not guilty because of insanity,' if the
killing was the offspring or product of mental disease in the defendant."
The rule made the definition of insanity a matter of fact to be determined by
the jury. It took the definition from the hands of the judges so that tests such as
the M'Naughten and "irresistible impulse" tests would not stand in the way of the
application of scientific truths in the insanity defense. Under this test juries could
apply the benefits of advanced technical knowledge in insanity without being
burdened by such things as the outmoded test of the defendant being able to tell
the difference between right and wrong. The New Hampshire doctrine cannot
be called a test as such, but it is rather a rule of law which states that the jury shall
be the sole judge as to what insanity is. The jury shall then go on to apply the
facts of the case at bar to that definition in order to determine the criminal responsibility of the defendant. Justice Brazelton has done the same thing in the
Durham case where it is stated:
"... the jury is not required to depend upon arbitrarily selected symptoms,
phases, or manifestations of the disease as criteria for determining the ultimate
question of fact upon which the claim depends. . . . Testimony as to such symptoms, phases, or manifestations, with other relevant evidence, will go to the jury
upon ultimate questions of fact which it alone can finally determine." [Emphasis
added.]
8
9
10

11

47
47
49
50

N.H. at 148 (1865).
N.H. at 150 (1865).
N.H. 399 (1896).
N.H. 369 (1871).
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Here we see that the federal court has followed the New Hampshire court
in leaving the definition of insanity to jury determination.
As a result of the New Hampshire rule there has been a complete dearth of
appeal cases in the field of insanity as a defense to crimes in that state. The reason
is simply that an appeal court will not review a jury's finding of fact, and, as pointed out above, the definition of insanity is a fact to be found by the jury. It would
seem to follow that, in the District of Columbia, cases in which the insanity doctrine is invoked as a defense will not frequently be heard on appeal. There is one
distinction, however, between the New Hampshire rule and the Durham rule.
This is that the New Hampshire courts did not and still have not defined "mental
disease" while the federal court has already defined "mental disease" and "mental
defect".
It is true that these definitions seem loose and all inclusive and leave no room
for judicial interpretation, 1 2 therefore, it would appear that the fate of the new
federal rule will be the same as that of the New Hampshire rule.
The New Hampshire rule was to a limited extent the basis of a proposed model
statute for an insanity defense. 18 The model statute, however, was later repudiated
by the same group which had originally adopted it." Several states have considered the rule, but apparently none have adopted it as it existed in New Hampshire. 15 In the Durham case, Justice Brazelton has recognized the inadequacy of
the insanity tests which are prevalent in the United States today. One would gather,
forn reading the excellent study by Justice Brazelton in the Durham decision,
that the best remedy for this inadequacy is the New Hampshire rule as devised
by Justice Doe and a psychiatrist, Isaac Ray, in an early meeting of the scientific
and legal minds. 16 After more than eighty years, another American jurisdiction
has followed that lead. It is likely that other courts and legislatures will also follow it.
Carl F. Skinner
Member of the Middler Class
12 Certainly logic dictates that there is no course a "condition" might take other than "improving", "deteriorating", or doing neither of these. At the same time the three causation factors
appear to include all possible sources of a "mental defect".
13 1 Hitchler, Criminal Law 144 (1939). See also Keedy, E., Insanity and Criminal Responsibility, 30 Harv. L. Rev. 535, for the text of the model statute.
14 Gleuck, Sheldon, Mental Disorder and Criminal Law, p. 456, 1927.
15 Weihofen, Henry, Insanity as a Defense in Criminal Law, p. 82, 1933.
16 For an interesting account of the work of these two men in relation to the present subject matter, see Reich, Louis E., The Doe-Ray Correspondence: A Pioneer Collaboration in the Jurisprudence of Mental Disease, 63 Yale L. J. 183.
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CONSTITUTION OF THE UNITED

FIRST AND FOURTEENTH AMENDMENTS

PREVIOUS RESTRAINT OF FREE SPEECH

-

-

MOTION

PICTURES - STATE BOARD OF CENSURE
ACT OF 15 MAY 1915, P.L. 534
For forty years movies have been subjected to censorship in Pennsylvania.
Are the broad powers permitting this censorship about to be struck down?
In the recent case of Hallmark Productions, Inc. v. The Pennsylvania State
Board of Censors,' a Philadelphia Common Pleas Court declared that the Act of
Assembly2 creating the machinery of motion picture censorship constituted a
previous restraint 3 on the freedom of speech and as such offended the First and
Fourteenth Amendments of the Federal Constitution. This decision reversed an
order of the Censorship Board which had refused to permit the showing of the
film "She Should Have Said No" on the grounds that such film was "indecent
and immoral and in the opinion of the Board tended to debase and corrupt morals". 4
The case is now under appeal to the Pennsylvania Supreme Court.
"She Should Have Said No" depicted the life of a narcotics peddler and the
methods by which he involved innocent persons in the sale and use of marijuana
cigarettes. A young chorus girl, in an attempt to pursue her career successfully
and to get necessary funds to send her brother through college, makes the acquaintance of this peddler and thereafter becomes a drug addict. The viewer is
shown the methods employed in smuggling the contraband cigarettes into the city
from rural areas, the manner of selling and transferring the illicit narcotics to
the individual buyer and user and the methods by which the smoker may receive
th'e maximum exhilartion from the narcotic in the cigarettes.
The judges of the common pleas court viewed this picture in its entirety and,
after hearing the arguments, stated that, although "from a public point of view
nothing but harm can result from the 'exhibition of this film", 5 they were compelled most reluctantly to remove the ban upon the exhibition in Pennsylvania
1 Hallmark Productions, Inc. v. Edna R. Carroll, John Clyde Fisher and Beatrice Z. Miller, as
members of the Pennsylvania State Board of Censors, Philadelphia Court of Common Pleas No. 2,
No. 9265 June Term, 1953, September 21, 1954.
2 Act of 15 May 1915, P. L. 534, as amended by the Act of 8 May 1929, P. L. 1655; 4 P.S. 43.
3 Previous restraint is to be distinguished from a proper exercise of the police power in restraining exhibitions of motion pictures after the initial showing if such exhibitions are held contrary to the public welfare. "In the first place the main purpose of such a constitutional provision (the First Amendment) is to prevent all such previous restraints upon publication. . . they
do not prevent the subsequent punishment of such as may be deemed contrary to the public welfare." Patterson v. Colorado, 205 U.S. 454, 51 L. Ed. 879 (1907).
4 See n. 1, supra. Article 6, provides: "Approvals by Board. The Board shall examine or supervise the examinations of all films, reels, or views, to be exhibited or used in Pennsylvania; and
shall approve such films, reels, or views which are moral and proper; and shall disapprove such
as are sacrilegious, obscene, indecent or immoral, or such as tend, in the judgment of the Board,
to debase or corrupt morals. This section shall not apply to announcement or advertising slides
or to films or reels containing current news events or happenings, commonly known as news reels,
which are not in violation of the provisions of this section."
5 See n. 1, supra.
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for the reason that the censorship statute offends the Federal Constitution as construed by the United States Supreme Court in Joseph Burstyn, Inc. v. Wilson,
Commissioner of Education of New York, 6 hereinafter referred to by its popular
name, the Miracle Case. There the New York State Board of Regents rescinded a
license for the showing of Roberto Rosselini's Italian film, "The Miracle", on
the grounds that the picture was "sacrilegious" within the meaning of a New
York statute requiring denial of a license if a film is "sacrilegious". 7 The United
States Supreme Court reversed the New York Court of Appeals, which had upheld
the order of the Board of Regents, and stated that the word "sacrilegious" was
unconstitutionally vague and as such violated due process and constituted a previous
restraint on freedom of speech. This Miracle Case expressly overruled Mutual Film
Corp. v. Industrial Commissioner of Ohio,8 decided in 1915, which held that
motion pictures were an amusement and as such were not part of the press of the
country or an organ of public opinion.
If the Pennsylvania Supreme Court follows its earlier decisions on this question, the constitutionality of this statute will be upheld. In 1915, in Buffalo
Branch, Mutual Film Corp. v. Breitinger,9 the Pennsylvania Supreme Court held
that the Act of 191110 which provided for the appointment of a State Board of
Censors to regulate the operation and exhibition of motion pictures, did not violate either the state Bill of Rights or the Fourteenth Amendment of the Federal
Constitution. In this case the court refused to grant an injunction enjoining the
Censor Board from banning the showing of certain films in Pennsylvania."
Pcnnsylvania courts later applied this doctrine to cases arising under the Act of
1915.12 In Re Goldwin Distributing Corporation13 held that the Censorship Board
did not act arbitrarily in refusing to grant a license for the exhibition of the film
"The Brand" on the grounds "that said reels tend,

. .

.to debase and corrupt the

6 343 U.S. 495, 96 L. Ed. 1098, 72 Sup. Ct. 777 (1952).
7 The New York censorship statute at that time provided: "The director of the division or,
when authorized by the regents, the officers of a local office or bureau shall cause to be promptly
examined every motion picture film submitted to them as herein required, and unless such film or
a part thereof is obscene, indecent, immoral, inhuman, sacrilegious, or is of such a character that
its exhibition would tend to corrupt morals or incite to crime shall issue a license therefor. If such
director or. when so authorized, such officer shall not license any film submitted, he shall furnish
to the applicant therefor a written report of the reasons for his refusal and a description of each
rejected part of a film not rejected in toto." 16 McKinney's Consolidated Laws of New York § 122
(1953).
S 236 U.S. 230, 59 L. Ed. 552, 35 Sup. Ct. 387 (1915).
9 250 Pa. 225, 95 Atl. 433 (1915).
10 Act of 19 June 1911, P. L. 1067, repealed by the Act of 15 May 1915, P. L. 534. Part of Section 2 of the 1911 Act which said it shall be the duty of the censorship board "to approve such
as shall be moral and to withhold approval from such as shall tend to debase or corrupt the morals",
and part of Section 6 which states that such board shall have the power to disapprove such motion
pictures "which are sacrilegious, obscene, indecent or immoral or such as tend to corrupt morals"
are in essence reenacted in Section 6 of the 1915 Act.
11 It is interesting to note that the court in Buffalo Branch, Mutual Film Corp. v. Breitinger, in
support of its decision, cited the case of Mutual Film Corporation v. Industrial Commissioner of
Ohio, which decision as previously noted has been expressly overruled by the Miracle Case.
12 See n. 2, supra.
13 265 Pa. 335, 108 Atl. 816 (1919).
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morals". 14 In Re The Ramparts We Watch 1" the Censorship Board refused to
approve a portion of a documentary film depicting the German conquest of Poland,
and advanced as its only reason that such film "has a tendency to corrupt and
debase morals". 16
It is the opinion of this writer, however, that the case of Buffalo Branch,
Mutual Film Corp. v. Breitinger'7 will be overruled and that the Act of 191518
will be declared unconstitutional. This opinion is based not only on the weight
which must be given to the Miracle Case but upon an even more recent decision
of the United States Supreme Court. In Commercial Pictures Corp. v. Regents of
University of State of New York, 19 it reversed an order of the New York Board of
Censors which had banned the film "La Ronde" because "it was immoral and
would tend to corrupt morals". The Court relied upon the Miracle Case. In essence,
the language used by the New York Board of Censors in rejecting the film "La
Ronde" and that of the Pennsylvania Board of Censors in rejecting the film "She
Should Have Said No" are, for all practical purposes, one and the same. The
Pennsylvania Board rejected the film because it was "indecent and immoral and
tends to debase and corrupt morals" and the New York Board of Regents rejected
the film because "it was immoral and would tend to corrupt morals". The similarity in these cases is striking.
Even though the Pennsylvania movie censorship statute may be declared unconstitutional, the most interesting question raised by this cas'e will remain unanswered. Is movie censorship unconstitutional per se?
In the Miracle Case the Supreme Court was not called upon to decide whether
a state may or may not censor motion pictures under a clearly drawn statute. It
limited its decision to holding that a film could not be banned on the basis that
it was "sacrilegious". "Since the term sacrilegious is the sole standard under attack here, it is not necessary for us to decide whether a state may censor motion
pictures under a dearly drawn statute designed and applied to prevent the showing of obscene films." 20 In the words of Justice Frankfurter, "That is a very dif21
ferent question from the one now before us." '
This question takes on considerable import when we stop to consider what
might be the fate of any subsequent Pennsylvania statute 'enacted by the legislature
in lieu of the present statute being declared unconstitutional. Will such a statute,

14
15

Ibid.

16
17

Ibid.
See n. 13, supra.

18
19
20
21

See n. 2, supra.
346 U.S. 588, 98 L. Ed. 235, 74 Sup. Ct. 296 (1954).

39 D & C 437 (1940).

See n. 6, supra.

Ibid.

RECENT CASES

more dearly drawn,2 2 meet the constitutional requirement of definiteness, or will
it be declared invalid on the ground that all censorship statutes are unconstitutional
per se? The police power may be exercised to prevent the continued showing of
any film which is contrary to the public welfare after its initial exhibition.23 Can
this police power, however, b'e extended to include prior censorship of all motion
pictures? The question is not answered in the Miracle Case.
The Miracle Case was preceded in time by a series of Supreme Court decisions invalidating "previous" restraints upon the freedom of speech. In Near v.
Minnesota,2 4 a Minnesota statute authorizing the 'enjoining of a newspaper for
publishing "malicious, scandalous and defamatory matter" 25 was held to constitute a "previous" restraint upon freedom of speech. In Cantwell v. State of Connecticut,26 a "prior" restraint upon freedom of speech and religion was held to have
been imposed by a Connecticut statute which prohibited solicitation of money or
services for any religious, charitable or philanthropic cause without prior authority
from the Secretary of the Public Welfare Council. In Thomas v. Collins, 27 a Texas
statute which required a union organizer to obtain an organizer's card to solicit
members was held to constitute a "previous" restraint upon one's right of free
speech and free assembly. The doctrine was extended to include motion pictures
in the Miracle Case.
In Near v. Minnesota, the Court stated, "The protection even as to previous
restraint is not absolutely unlimited", and laid down certain exceptions thereto
such as publications in time of war which would be a hindrance to the national
effort, or obscene publications or publications inciting to acts of violence and overthrow by force of orderly government.2 8 This still does not, however, answer the
question as to what will happen when the constitutionality of a clearly drawn
censorship statute is at stake which does not involve the possibl-e exceptions laid
down in Near v. Minnesota.
22 Such as the present New York statute enacted after the prior Censorship Act had been declared unconstitutional by the Miracle and La Ronde Cases. "1. For the purpose of section one
hundred twenty-two of this chapter, the term 'immoral' and the phrase 'of such a character that its
exhibition would tend to corrupt morals' shall denote a motion picture film or part thereof, the
dominant purpose or effect of which is erotic or pornographic; or which portrays acts of sexual
immorality, perversion, or lewdness, or which expressly or impliedly presents such acts as desirable, acceptable or proper patterns of behavior. 2. For the purpose of section one hundred twentytwo of this chapter, the term 'incite to crime' shall denote a motion picture the dominant purpose
or effect of which is to suggest that the commission of criminal acts or contempt for law is profitable, desirable, acceptable, or respectable behavior; or which advocates or teaches the use of or the
methods of use of, narcotics or habit-forming drugs." Added L. 1954, c. 620, eff. April 12, 1954,
16 McKinney's Consolidated Laws of New York § 122a.
23 President Judge Lewis in the Hallmark opinion stated: "The police power is broad in scope,
and we believe that it may be invoked to put an end to the exposure of films that upon exhibition
are proved to be clearly indecent, obscene, or such as tend to provoke rioting, etc." See n. 1, supra.
24 283 U.S. 697, 75 L. Ed. 1357, 51 Sup. Ct. 625 (1930).
25 Ibid.
26 310 U.S. 296, 84 L. Ed. 1213, 60 Sup. Ct. 900 (1940).
27 323 U.S. 516, 89 L. Ed. 430, 65 Sup. Ct. 315 (1944).
28 See n. 8, supra.
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More recently and subsequent to the Miracle Case, Justice Douglas in Commercial Pictures Corp. v. Regents of University of State of New York stated: 29
"The First and Fourteenth Amendments say Congress and the
States shall make no law which abridges the freedom of speech or of the
press. In order to say 'no law' does not mean what it says but that 'no
law' is qualified to mean 'some law' I cannot take that step. In this
nation every writer, actor or producer no matter what medium of expression he should use should be free from the censor. The constitutional
g farantee of freedom of speech and press prevents a state from estabing censorship of motion pictures. 80
In W. L. Gelling v. State of Texas,3 ' Justice Douglas again stated:
"If a Board of Censors can tell the American people what is in
their .best interests to see or to read or to hear then thought is regimented,
authority substituted for liberty and the great purpose ofthe First Amendment to keep uncontrolled the freedom of expression defeated." 82
If Justice Douglas is expressing the opinion of the entire Court it would seem
to indicate that not only will the Supreme Court declare unconstitutional movie
censorship statutes which provide for banning "immoral" dnd "sacrilegious"
films, but they will declare all such censorship unconstitutional per se.
John J. Shumaker
Member of the Middler Class

MUNICIPALITIES

- ZONING DISCRETION -

BOARD OF ADJUSTMENT
VARIANCES

-

The recent case of Ward v .Scott,' decided by the New Jersey Supreme Court,
is an important decision in zoning law. By comparison with an earlier decision
in the same case, 2 it affords a local governing body with an example of what a
resolution granting a zoning variance must contain; it reaffirms the older pronouncements that actions of a zoning board of adjustment will not be reversed on
appeal "in the absence of an affirmative showing that it was manifestly in abuse
of their discretionary authority"; it clarifies the distinction between subsections
(c) and (d) of the statute granting power to a board of adjustment to 'either grant
or recommend a variance to a zoning ordinance; and it provides, for the first time,
a definite statement that reasons for granting a variance, though individually inadequate, may b'e considered in the aggregate as sufficient.
29
30
81
82
1
2

See n. 23, supra. Concurring opinion filed by Justice Douglas in which Justice Black agreed.
Ibid.
343 U.S. 960, 96 L. Ed. 1359, 72 Sup. Ct. 1002 (1952).
Ibid. Concurring opinion.
16 N.J. 16, 105 A.2d 851 (1954).
Ward v. Scott, 11 N.J. 117, 93 A.2d 385 (1952).
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The Statute
The statute which the instant case interprets has been called "the most controversial of all the provisions of the state enabling zoning statute".8 New Jersey
Revised Statutes 40:55-39 provides as follows:
"The board of adjustment shall have the power to: ...

(c). Where

by reason of exceptional narrowness, shallowness of shape of a specific
piece of property, or by reason of other extraordinary and exceptional
situation or condition of such piece of property, the strict application of
any regulation enacted under the act would result in peculiar and exceptional practical difficulties to, or exceptional and undue hardship upon
the owner of such proprty, to authorize, upon an appeal relating to such
property, a variance from such strict application so as to relieve such
difficulties or hardship; provided, however, that no variance shall be
granted under this paragraph to allow a structure or use in a district restricted against such structure or use. (d). Recommend in particular
cases and for special reasons to the governing body of the municipality
the granting of a variance to allow a structure or use in a district restricted
against such structure or use. Whereupon the governing body or board
of public works may, by resolution, approve or disapprove such recommendation. If such recommendation shall be approved by the governing
body or board of public works then the administrative officer in charge
of granting permits shall forthwith issue a permit for such structure or
use.
"No relief may be granted or action taken under the terms of this
section unless such relief can be granted without substantial detriment
the intent and
to the public good and will not substantially impair
purpose of the zone plan and zoning ordinance." 4
Background of Ward v. Scott
On June 19, 1950, the Town Council of Bloomfield granted a variance for
a shopping center to Ligham Construction Company pursuant to a recommendation of thL board of adjustment under R. S. 40:55-39 (d). That action was
attacked in the Law Division of the New Jersey Superior Court but was sustained
in an opinion which set forth the pertinent facts and that court's conclusion that
the municipal bodies were justified "in finding special circumstances to warrant
tie granting of the variance requested, and that not to grant the variance would
be an undue hardship". On appeal the Supreme Court held that R. S. 40:55-39
constitutionally vested authority in the governing body to grant variances, upon
(he recommendation of the board of adjustment, "in particular cases and for special
reasons" in accordance with the explicit statutory terms and without reference to
the hardship requirement in subsection (c) on variances which may be granted
directly by the board of adjustment acting alone. They determined, however, that
there were insufficient findings under subsection (d) and, accordingly, remanded
3
4

Romano, Frank, Zoning and Planning Law in New Jersey, p. 165, (1953).
As amended L. 1948, c. 305, p. 1223, § 6; L. 1949, c. 242, p. 779, § 1; L. 1953, c. 288, p.

,§ 1.
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the cause to the board for "reconsideration, findings and recommendation to the
town council". 5
On May 14, 1953, the board of adjustment again recommended the granting
of the variance but this time its resolution set forth detailed findings and special
reasons in support of its recommendations. On June 1, 1953, the town council
approved the recommendation for the reasons expressed in the resolution of the
board and "upon the understanding that the land would be developed in accordance with plans filed with the board and the building inspector". 6 Once again
the matter was brought before the Law Division which, on October 30, 1953,
sustained the council's action and dismissed the plaintiff's complaint. A comparison
of the two resolutions will illustrate what must be included in a resolution to
render it valid and what constitutes an insufficient resolution.
It is to be commented, of course, that the second resolution embodied in the
instant case is not a "model" to be followed precisely. There was enough question
in regard to its sufficiency for an appeal to be taken, as the earlier resolution,
through the Law Division and to the Supreme Court. Also, the final decision met
with a strong dissenting opinion by Justice Heher, concurred in by Chief Justice
Vanderbilt. 7
The importance of the second resolution, however, is to show that a resolution
must be complete. The record of the hearing of the board of adjustment and the
bases upon which the board makes its decision must be shown in the record, and
it must be clear enough to show reasonableness and lack of capriciousness, as well
as conformity to the statutory requirements.
Insufficient Reasons
Several of the ten reasons 8 set forth in the resolution had previously been

considered insufficient, in themselves, to warrant the granting of a variance. Perhaps the primary example of this is found in reason number six, "That the adjacent
commercial structures and uses render it economically unsound to develop the lands
for residential purposes .. " In Scaduto v. Bloomfield,9 it has been held, "It is
not per se a sufficient reason for variation in zoning ordinance restrictions that
nonconforming use is more profitable to the landowner." This principle was affirmed in Beirn v. Morris,10 decided shortly before the instant case.

5 See n. 2, supra.
6 See n. 1, supra.
7 For those seeking to rely on the decision in this case, but who are wary of a strong dissent,
part of the dissent, at least, was based upon the fact that the applicant who had owned a large tract
of land "by plan of the whole . . . set apart a portion for the commercial enterprise in such way
as to give it the semblance of a unique relation to the remainder". Justice Heher commented that
"the owner may not so lay out his land as to provide the basis for a variance for irregularity of
shape, and the like, and thus to defeat the general rule of the ordinance."
8 See n. 1, supra.
9 127 N.J.L. 1, 20 A.2d 649 (1941).
10 14 N.J. 529, 103 A.2d 361 (1954).
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Nevertheless, despite these previous rulings, the instant court decided as follows:
"In passing on this issue (whether in the light of the special reasons
advanced and the supporting evidence, the variance may be deemed to
have been granted arbitrarily, capriciously or unreasonably) we must look
at the entire picture and consider the reasons in their agregate; it is in
nowise controlling that one or more of the reasons standing alone would
not be legally sufficient."" 1
It must be noted, however, that the Beirn v Morris case,' 2 and others cited
for the principle that economic hardship is not per se a sufficient reason for
variance, was an appeal under subsection (c) of a denial of an application by the
board of adjustment. In that case the appellants were seeking to rebut a presumption of validity of the decision and to convince the appellate court that
"economic hardship" should have been considered. In Ward v. Scott, the economic
hardship was, in fact, one of the several factors considered in recommending the
variance.
The conclusion, therefore, seems to be that where a variance has been requested on the ground of reasons which, separately, are insufficient and that request has been denied, the court will not normally reverse the local officials.
Where the variance has been granted, however, even though partially because of
reasons which in themselves may be insufficient, the grant will be upheld in the
absence of arbitrary or capricious action, if, in the aggregate, the reasons indicate
that the action of the officials was reasonable.
It may also be noted that the resolution includes "that the foregoing facts
established by the evidence corroborates the conclusion of the Board upon personal inspection of the site.... Where, as here, the members of the board have
made a personal inspection and have used that in reaching their decision, such
fact must appear in the record.' 8
Burden of Proof
As mentioned before, it is no longer a point of dispute that a party appealing
a decision of a board of adjustment must rebut the presumption of validity for
"the ultimate interests of effective zoning will be advanced by permitting the
action of the municipal officials to stand, in the absence of an affirmative showing
that it was manifestly in abuse of their discretionary authority". This is true
whether the board of adjustment had granted 14 or denied the variance 15 or whether
the decision has been based on subsection (c)' 6 or subsection (d)17 of R. S.
40:55-39.
11
12
1
14
15
16
17

See n. 1, supra.
See n. 10, supra.
Giordano v. Newark, 2 N.J. 45, 64 A.2d 462, affirmed 2 N.J. 585, 67 A.2d 454 (1949).
165 Augusta Street, Inc., v. Collins, 9 N.J. 259, 87 A.2d 889 (1952).
Rexon v. Board of Adjustment, Haddonfield, 10 N.J. 1, 89 A.2d 233 (1952).
See n. 15, supra.
Monmouth Lumber Co., v. Ocean Township, 9 N.J. 64, 87 A.2d 9 (1952).
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The instant case seems to carry this idea a little further and to give advice
to parties seeking to attack an action of a board of adjustment and/or local governing body. There are occasionally times when an appeal may be based upon
grounds that the local decision was made in bad faith or because of fraud. The
app'ellants, however, in the ordinary case are warned not to approach their appeal
with an attitude of suspicion that local officials perform their duties in complete
bad'faith. It was stated in the Ward case, supra:
"Local officials who are thoroughly familiar with their community's
characteristics and interests and are the proper representatives of its
people are undoubtedly the best equipped to pass initially on such applications for variance. And their determinations should not be approached
with a general feeling of suspicion, for as Justice Holmes has properly
admonished: 'Universal distrust creates universal incompetence.' ",18
46 'sections(c) and (d)
One of the difficulties which the appellate court has encountered in zoning
cases under this statute is the difference in precedents under subsections (c) and
(d). In the first Ward v. Scott case, 19 the Supreme Court, through Justice Jacobs,
said:
"In the Monmouth Lumber cas'e Justice Burling reviews the history
of R. S. 40:55-39, with particular reference to its recent extensive revision. .

.

.As he pointed out, subsection (c) provides that the board

of adjustment may grant a variance where, by reason of the extraordinary situation or condition of the property, the strict application of the
zoning restrictions would result in 'peculiar and exceptional practical
difficulties to, or exceptional and undue hardship upon, the owner'; in
contrast, however, subsection (d) omits the specific requirement for a
shQwing of practical difficulties or undue hardship and provides that
'in particular cases and for special reasons' the board of adjustment may
recommend to the governing body of the municipality that a variance
be granted. Unlike subsection (c), action taken by the board of adjustment under subsection (d) is subject to approval or disapproval by the
municipality, and no variance 'can be granted without substantial detriimpair the intent and
ment to the public good and will not substantially
20
purpose of the zone plan and zoning ordinance'."
After the decision was rendered in the first Ward v. Scott case, R. S. 40:55-39
was amended by the legislature. Although it sharply restricted subsection (c) so
as to prohibit the board itself from granting any variance which allows a structure
cr use in a district restricted against such structure or use, it "deliberately continued subsection (d) without alteration" so as to permit the board "in particular
cases and for special reasons"2 1 to recommend for action by the governing body
a variance which allows a structure or use in a district restricted against such use.
18 See n. 1, supra.
19 See n. 2, supra.
20 Citing Leiman v. Board of Adjustment, Cranford Twp., 9 N.J. 336 (1952); Gerkin v. Village
of Ridgewood, 17 N.J. Super. 472 (1952).

21

See n. 2, supra.
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It is important to distinguish the subsections, not only in regard to the granting or recommending of a variance, but also in presentation of an appeal based
on either subsection. It is obvious that a decision based on subsection (c) will not
carry the weight of a precedent based on subsection (d) when the appeal is based
on the latter subsection, as the following statement of Justice Jacobs clearly shows:
....
Nor are we particularly concerned with precedents under
subsection (c) which contain restrictions
not embodied in subsection (d)
22
Cf. Beirn vs. Morris, supra."
Reasons for Clarity in Making Decision on Local Level
Under the new proceedings in lieu of the prerogative writ of certiorari it is
possible for a board of adjustment to face litigation no matter how they should
decide on an application for a variance, and, indeed, from the amount of zoning
litigation now on court dockets, it appears that that is the case. If the decision is to
grant a variance, any citizen in the area of the subject property may bring an action
to have the variance set aside, whereas, if the application is denied, the applicant
has the right of review by the courts. As noted above, the appellant has to face
the presumption of validity of the decision. Strict conformance with procedural
rules and a carefully worded resolution, however, will do much to discourage
litigation following a decision by a board of adjustment.
Although in an action denying a variance the courts do not require the reasons to be set forth, nevertheless, it would seem advisable for the board to set
forth their reasons for denial so as to discourage appeal by an applicant who then,
besides having to rebut the presumption of reasonable action, would have to rebut
a strong and complete record. Likewise, if the record, in cases where a variance
has been granted, shows clear and sufficient reasons for the action, complaining
neighbors (and their attorney who is bound to proceed only on a good cause of
action) will be less likely to bring an action.
The two cases of Ward v. Scott include another reason for a complete record
in cases where the application is granted. As noted, the original resolution was
insufficient and the cause was remanded to the board for "reconsideration, findings and recommendation to the town council". Thus, the board of adjustment
and town council not only spent time in considering the original request and in
defending their action up through the Supreme Court, but they also found themselves back reconsidering the application de novo. 28 Then, following their second
decision, the action was defended, again through the Supreme Court. This is an
expensive and time-consuming procedure and should give an incentive to any
22

See n. 1, supra.

28 Bernard Schwartz, writing in 1953 Annual Survey of American Law, published by New York
University School of Law, comments on a similar case: "There would certainly appear to be a
better way of handling these cases, which, at best, take an unconscionably long time, than by
marching them twice through the agencies and the courts. Truly, as Mr. Justice Frankfurter himself aptly expressed it, 'this danger if not likelihood of thus marching the king's men up the hill
and then marching them down again seems to me a mode of judicial administration to which I
cannot yield concurrence.' (dissenting in City of Yonkers v. United States, 320 U.S. 685, 694 (1944)."
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board of adjustment to make certain that whatever they decide is not only legally
sufficient, but also that the record is so complete and certain as to discourage
litigation.
Comparison with Pennsylvania Zoning Law
The New Jersey statute is uncommon in setting one standard by which a
zoning board may grant a variance and another whereby the board may recommend
a variance to the local governing body. In Pennsylvania, separate statutes regulate
the several classes of municipalities. An example is found in the statute regulating
activities of a zoning board in a city of th'e first class:
"Board of Adjustment shall have the following powers: . . . 3. To
authorize, upon appeal, in specific cases, such variance from the terms of
the ordinance as will not be contrary to the public interest, where, owing
to special conditions, a literal enforcement of the provisions of the ordiof the
nance will result in unnecessary hardship, and so that the spirit
24
ordinance shall be observed and substantial justice done."
From the above statute several terms appear similiar to thos-e found in New
Jersey Revised Statutes 40:55-39, for example, "in specific cases", "special conditions", "unnecessary hardship" and the provision that the variance not be contrary to the spirit of the ordinance.
The burden of proof is substantially the same on appeal. The Pennsylvania
Supreme Court has held:
"The granting of variance under zoning code lies within discretionary power of Board of Adjustment and this court will not
25 set aside
Board's decision in the absence of abuse of that discretion."
In regard to the problem that there be sufficient reasons for granting a
variance the case of Ventresca v. Exley26 held as follows:
"Accordingly it has been consistently held that the authority of the
Board of Adjustment is not an arbitrary one and that it may grant a
variance only if an alleged hardship is 'substantial and of compelling
force' . .. and only where the hardship is unnecessary and the interests of
the owners and occupants of the neighboring properties are protected."
As pointed out above 27 the problem of "remanding for reconsideration"
is frequent in all jurisdictions, and this is true in the courts of Pennsylvania, no
less than New Jersey or the United States Supreme Court. Consequently, a complete record showing careful consideration and based upon legally sufficient reasons should be the goal of each local board of adjustment.
Harman R. Clark, Jr.
Member of the Middler Class

24
26
26
27

Act of May 6, 1929, P. L. 1551, § 8, 53 P.S. 3829.
Phillips v. Griffiths, 366 Pa. 468, 77 A.2d 375 (1951).
358 Pa. 98, 56 A.2d 210 (1948).
See n. 23, supra.
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CRIMINAL LAW -

HOMICIDE -

FELONY MURDER

COMMITTED IN PERPETRATION OF ARSON PROXIMATE CAUSE -

DEATH OF ACCOMPLICE
In the recent case of Commonwealth v. Bolish,I the Lackawanna County Court
held the defendant, D1, guilty for the murder of his co-conspirator, D2, during
the commission of an arson.
The Jury found the facts to be as follows: D1 and D2 conspired to commit
arson. Dl was not present at the scene of the felony, but while D2 was setting
the fire some combustible material exploded killing D2.
The Commonwealth presented its case on the theory that the death of D2 was
a felony-murder, the death occurring as a result of arson, in the commission of
which felony Dl was one of the principals. At the end of the Commonwealth's case,
Di demurred to the evidence, and the demurrer being overruled by the trial judge,
D1 rested without presenting any evidence and without taking the stand himself.
Dl then presented a motion in arrest of judgment and a motion for a new
trial based on two theories, namely, (1) that the conviction should not be allowed
to stand since the evidence was purely circumstantial and (2) that under any
view of the facts, the victim, D2, must be regarded as an accomplice of the perpetrator of the arson and accidentally caused his own death and that under such
circumstances the theory of felony-murder should not apply.
There have been two cases in which similar factual situations have arisen.
In People v. Ferlin2 , Dl hired D2 to burn a building, and in doing so; D2 was
killed. The court held Dl innocent of the murder charge. According to the California Penal Codes murder is "the unlawful killing of a human being with malice
aforethought". The court reasoned that the deceased could not be guilty of his own
murder and, therefore, neither could his confederate. The court stated as follows:
"It would not be seriously contended that one accidentally killing
himself whil-e engaged in the commission of a felony was guilty of
murder. If the defendant herein is guilty of murder because of the accidental killing of his co-conspirator, then it must follow that Skola (D2)
was also guilty of murder, and, if he had recovered from his burns that
he would have been guilty of an attempt to commit murder.... It cannot
be said from the instant case that D1 had a common design that the deceased should accidentally kill himself".
In People v. LaBarbera,4 the defendant, D1, hired his co-conspirator, D2 to
burn a building, during the commission of which arson D2 was killed when an
explosion occurred in the house. The court acquitted Dl on the basis of the wording of the New York statute defining homicide as "the killing of one human being by an act, procurement, or omission of another". 5 The killing of D2 occurred
1
2
8
4
5

55 Lack. Jur. 213 (1954).
203 Cal. 587, 265 Pac. 230 (1928).
California Penal Code, § 187.
287 N. Y. Supp. 257 (1936).
New York Penal Law, § 1042.
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by his own act and, therefore, was not the act of another. Since D2's death did
not come within the definition of criminal homicide, D1 was acquitted.
These two cases are the only cases in point where D2 kills D2, and they
illustrate that the law has never held D1 guilty where D2 kills D2.
Why then, did the Lackawanna County Court hold D1 guilty? The majority
of the court reasoned that the basis of felony-murder in Pennsylvania is the theory
of proximate cause and, therefore, these two decisions are not applicable since
they were not decided on the question of causation.
The author disagrees with this reasoning on two grounds, namely, (1) that
malice, not proximate cause, is the underlying theory of felony-murder and that
proximate cause is merely a limitation imposed on the felony-murder doctrine, and
(2) that in any event, the felony-murder doctrine should not apply to the situation
where D2 kills D2 and that the Pennsylvania court erred in not following the
precedent set by the California and New York courts.
As to point one, Judge Robinson, in his dissenting opinion said:
"The majority hold that the 'theory of proximate cause is the basis
of felony murder in Pennsylvania,' a statement of law, which in its broad
sense, is not strictly correct. Causation is a factor applicable to murder
as well as other criminal cases but the basis of liability for felony murder
is the law of murder itself. Causation explains the results reached in certain classes of cases but it does not determine basic liability; its true
purpose in the law is to define the extent of responsibility for the consequences of an unlawful act."
In other words, Judge Robinson believes that in order to apply this doctrine,
we must adhere to the law of murder, which requires that the defendant have
malice in order to be guilty of murder. 6 Where do we get this malice? At common
7
law, murder was defined as "unlawful homicide with malice aforethought".
Malice aforethought included:
(1) intent to kill,
(2) intent to inflict great bodily harm,
(3) intent to do an act with knowledge that it is likely to cause death or
great bodily harm,
(4) intent to commit a felony,
(5) intent to oppose any officer of justice in discharging certain of his duties. 8
How did this fourth class of malice arise? At common law, the punishment
of other felonies and murder was the same-death. 9 If during the commission of
a felony a homicide occurred, the law did not concern itself with the defendant's
malice in regard to the murder, since the defendant would be hanged for com,Conmonwealth v. Guida, 341 Pa. 305, 19 A.2d 98 (1941).
C. C. 311 (1887).
3 Stephen, History of the Criminal Law of England 22 (1833).
9 ;4Blackstone's Commentaries § 98 (1499).
6

-7 Regina v. Serne, 16 Cox
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0
mitting the felony. Later, the punishment for felony was modified.' Homicides
were being committed in which no express malice was present and none could be
inferred. Consequently, the need arose for a concept of malice, necessary to convict the defendant of murder, so that malice could be deemed to exist as a matter
of law in cases where express malice was not present yet where the killer deserved
to be punished for murder." In Mansell and Herbert's Case,12 several men were
convicted of murder for the killing of a bystander while they were attempting a
robbery. This is the beginning of what later became known as the felony-murder
doctrine.
The common law rule was that if a person killed another in doing or attempting to do another act and the act done or attempted to be done was a felony,
the killing was murder. There was thus supplied the state of mind called malice
which was essential to constitute murder. The malice of the initial offense attaches
8
to whatever else the criminal may do in connection therewith.'
An analogous doctrine is incorporated in the laws of Pennsylvania by the
statute which provides that "all murder which shall be perpetrated by means of
poison, or by lying in wait, or by any other kind of willful, deliberate, and premeditated killing, or which shall be committed in the perpetration of, or attempting
rape, robbery, burglary, or kidnapping, shall be murder
to perpetrate any arson,
14
in the first degree."
The felony-murder doctrine is not one of limitless application. At first, it was
confined to robbery cases. 15 Coke states a broad rule that a killing during the commission of any unlawful act constitutes murder. Coke's rule was later modified so
7
as to apply only in cases of felonies.' 6 In Regina v. Woodburne,' the court stated
by way of dictum that it would be murder if a man shot at a fowl and accidentally
killed a man, if he intended to steal the fowl since the stealing of the fowl was
considered a felony. This illustrates that the felony-murder rule, even with this
limitation, was still too harsh.
Justice Stephen, in Regina v. Serne,18 placed a further limitation upon this
rule when he declared:
"Instead of saying that any act done with intent to commit a felony
which causes death amounts to murder, it would be reasonable to say
that any act known to be dangerous to life, and likely in itself to cause
death done for the purpose of committing a felony which causes death,
should be murder."
1 Bishop's Criminal Law 447.
34 Ky. L. J. 160 (1946).
1 Dyer 128b, 73 Eng. Rep. 279 (1555).
See n. 6, supra.
Act of June 24, 1839, P. L. 872, § 701.
15 3 Coke, Third Institutes 52 (1680).
16 Rex v. Plummer, 84 Eng. Rep. 1103 (1701).
17 16 St. Tr. 53 (1722).
1s See n. 7, supra.
10
11
12
13
14
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Further limitations were imposed on the application of the felony-murder
doctrine. Among these are:
(1) By restricting it to felonies which are mala in se. 19
20
(2) By restricting it to dangerous felonies.
21
(3) By restricting it to felonies of violence.
22
(4) By restricting it to specifically enumerated felonies.
(5) By requiring that the homicide be the proximate result or probable con28
sequence of the felonious act.
(6) By contracting the period during which the felony can be said to be in
24
the course of being committed.
So we can see, that at its inception, the felony-murder doctrine was applied
so as to supply the element of malice necessary to convict the felon of murder, and
as it grew, limitations were placed upon it, restricting it to certain conditions.
The majority of the court in the Bolish case holds that the theory of proximate
cause is the basis of the felony-murder doctrine. It is this writer's contention that
the court is confusing the basis of the felony-murder doctrine with the limitations
imposed on it. In the case of Commonwealth v.Almeida2 5 which the Lackawanna
court quotes, Mr. Chief Justice Maxey said, "A knave who feloniously and maliciously starts a 'chain of reaction' of acts dangerous to human life must be held
responsible for the natural fatal results of his acts." The Lackawanna court says
the application of the theory of proximate cause is the basis of the doctrine of
felony-murder in Pennsylvania. It is this writer's contention that this is error. The
court, in th Almeida case, was not setting up the proximate cause theory as a basis
of the felony-murder doctrine. It was saying that if the act of the defendant was
not the proximate cause of the homicide, then the defendant was not guilty. This is
a limitation on the felony-murder doctrine.
In the case of Commonwealth v. Kelly, 20 which the majority of the Lackawanna court holds in support of its contention, the court says, "rMalice is the mainspring of his (D's) outlawed enterprise and his every act within the latter's ambit
is imputable to that base quality. Such a rule is essential to the protection of human
life." Does not this seem to indicate that the basis of the felony-murder doctrine
is to supply the element of malice? The author believes it does. The court goes
on to say, "In order for a homicide which is committed in the perpetration or
19 People v. Pavlic, 227 Mich. 562, '99 N. W. 373, 35 A. L. R. 741 (1924).
20 See n.'s 7 and 19, supra.
21 Director of Prosecutions v. Beard, A.C. 479 (1920); Rex v. Elnick, 33 Can.C.C. 174; 53
Dick. L. Rev. 298 (1920).
22 See n. 14, supra.
28 State v. Opher, 28 Del. 93, 188 At. 257 (1936); State v. Glover, 330 Mo. 209, 50 S. W.2d
1049, 87 A. L. R. 400 (1932); Regina v. Horsey, 3 F. & F. 287; Commonwealth v. Almeida, 362
Pa. 596, 68 A.2d 595 (1949).
24 People v. Marwig, 227 N. Y. 382, 125 N. E. 535, 22 A. L. R. 845 (1919).
25 See n. 23, supra.
26 333 Pa. 280, 4 A.2d 805 (1939).
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attempted perpetration of any of the enumerated felonies, to be adjudged murder
in the first degree, there must be no break in the chain of events and the homicidal act must be connected with the maliciously motivated offense." The break
in the chain of events seems to be a limitation on the felony-murder doctrine. In
other words, if there is a break in the chain of events, the doctrine does not apply.
The Lackawanna court also quotes Commonwealth v. Moyer 27 in support of
its contention. The court in the Moyer case said, "Where malice is the mainspring
of a criminal act, the actor will be held responsible for the consequences of his act
though it was not the one intended." In discussion of the Pennsylvania statute, that
court said tht murder was used rather than homicide for the reason that a killer in
the malicious perpetration of one of the specified felonies has committed common
law murder. "The felon obviously possesses that 'wickedness of disposition, hardness of -heart, cruelty and recklessness of consequences and a mind regardless of
social duty' which constitutes malice." The court is concerned with malice, and it
is this writer's contention that it meant that this transfer of intent to supply malice
is the real basis of the felony-murder doctrine.
Therefore, it is this writer's contention that the reasoning of the Lackawanna
court in holding that proximate cause is the basis of the felony-murder doctrine is
error, since malice is the basis of the felony-murder doctrine. Proximate cause is
merely a limitation upon the doctrine.
As to point two, it is the author's contention that the felony-murder doctrine
does not apply where D2 kills D2. Judge Robinson poses some good questions in
support of this point. Can the dead felon be guilty of his own murder? Why protect the lives of the felon and the law abiding alike? Why exact the life of this
surviving felon if the deceased co-felon can not be punished?
The felony-murder rule serves as a deterrent against felonious invasions of the
citizenry by outlaws and thereby affords protection to the lives and property of the
peaceful members of the community. When in the course of a felony, a felon is
killed by his own act, that reasoning is untenable. The law seeks to prevent recurrence of affirmative acts by using fear of punishment as a deterrent. The composition of capital punishment in a case where its deterrent value is negligible can
only be explained as revenge, a motive few courts would attempt to justify.
In the case of Commonwealth v. Moore,28 the court said that if the victim of

the felony killed D2, D1 would not be guilty of murder. This would be an extreme
extension of the felony-murder doctrine, and it exposes the unsoundness of the
position of the Commonwealth. In this case, if D1 is not guilty when the victim
kills D2, why should Di be guilty when D2 kills D2? He should not be. The
felony-murder doctrine should not apply in this instance.
27

357 Pa. 181, 53 A.2d 736 (1947).

28

121 Ky. 97, 88 S. W.

1085 (1905).
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Therefore, since the felony-murder doctrine was meant to protect the peace
loving citizens and to act as a deterrent factor, in the case where D2 kills D2
punishment of D1 will not satisfy these purposes and the felony-murder doctrine
should not apply. As Judge Robinson states it, "The critical question of fact under
the principles here expressed is: which one of the felons set off the fire, or otherwise stated, whose act killed Flynn (D2)?"
It will be interesting to note whether the Supreme Court of Pennsylvania will
allow this decision to stand, and thus broaden the scope of the felony-murder
doctrine, or will reverse the Lackawanna County Court's decision, thus placing a
fmth'er limitation on the felony-murder doctrine in Pennsylvania.
Sandor Yelen
Member of the Middler Class

